

Literature and Psychology

The News Letter of the Conference on Literature and Psychology of the Modern Language Association

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Editorial Address:
Dept. of English, The City College of New York
New York 31, New York

Leonard F. Manheim, Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate

Lore C. Kraus,
Editorial Assistant

Steering Committee for 1956

Leonard F. Manheim, The City College of New York, Chairman
Leon Edel, New York University
Louis Fraiberg, Wayne University
John V. Hagopian, University of Michigan

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No. 1

There is no harm, but, on the contrary, good, in arraying some of the ordinary facts of life in a slightly idealized and artistic guise. I have taken facts which relate to myself, because they chance to be nearest at hand, and likewise are my own property. And, as for egotism, a person, who has been burrowing, to his utmost ability, into the depths of our common nature, for the purposes of psychological romance, -- and who pursues his researches in that dusky region, as he needs must, as well by the tact of sympathy as by the light of observation, -- will smile at incurring such an imputation in virtue of a little preliminary talk about his external habits, his abode, his casual associates, and other matters entirely upon the surface. These things hide the man, instead of displaying him. You must make quite another kind of inquest, and look through the whole range of his fictional characters, good and evil, in order to detect any of his essential traits.

---Nathaniel Hawthorne
Preface to The Snow Image (1851)

IN THIS ISSUE

Minutes of the Sixth Annual Conference, by John V. Hagopian. . . . 3

Dr. Hagopian, secretary pro tem of the Conference, reports the discussion of papers originally read at the Discussion Group on Literature and Society

Editorial Comments 6

2.

"A Freudian View of Jonathan Swift," by Donald Ramsay Roberts. . . 8

Professor Roberts reviews and evaluates critically some psycho-analytic discussions of Swift and offers his own psycho-literary integration of the life and work of the vitriolic Dean. The author studied at Cornell, where he added to his majors in English and Comparative Literature, minors in Theories of Art, English history, and linguistics. He has taught at Ohio, Northwestern, Illinois, and Bradley, and was chairman of the Humanities Division at Kansas Wesleyan before assuming his present post at Norwich University at Northfield, Vermont. His earlier paper on "The Death Wish of John Donne" was noticed in BIBLIOGRAPHY (XIX), Vol. V, no. 3, at p. 52.

Book Review of Phyllis Greenacre's Swift and Carroll. A Psychoanalytic Study of Two Lives, by Frederick Wyatt, Deborah Bacon, and Arthur M. Eastman18

The first of our extended article-reviews of recent works in psycho-literary criticism and biography is the product of a collaboration by three members of the faculty of the University of Michigan; one a clinical psychologist whose felicity in literary criticism is familiar to our readers through his article on Virginia Woolf (Vol. IV, no. 2, pp. 12-23); the second an authority on Lewis Carroll, and the third a specialist in English literature of the eighteenth century.

Bibliography (XXI)28

Partly the product of the Editors' sojourn in European libraries. NOTE: We are still in need of volunteers to conduct systematic searches in the bound volumes of periodicals, foreign and domestic, especially since 1950, the terminal date of the Feldman bibliography.

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IN THE NEXT ISSUE

"The Prisoner and His Crimes: Summary Comments on a Longer Study of the Mind of William Cowper," by Hoosag K. Gregory (Case Institute)

"The Yellow Malady: Short Studies of Five Tragedies of Jealousy," by A. Bronson Feldman

An article-review on the first two volumes of the Jones biography of Freud, by John V. Hagopian (Michigan)

MINUTES

The sixth annual Conference on Literature and Psychology met at the Palmer House in Chicago on Tuesday, December 27, 1955, from 2 to 3:30 p. m. for the purpose of discussing the three papers published in LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY (Vol. V, no. 4, November, 1955) and delivered at the meeting of General Topics 6 (Literature and Society). These papers were "Literature and Psychology: A Question of Significant Form" by Robert M. Adams (Cornell), "Psychology and the Writer: The Creative Process" by Louis M. Fraiberg (Wayne), and "Freud, Conrad, and 'The Future of an Illusion'" by Alan M. Hollingsworth (Indiana). The Conference was chaired by Leon Edel (NYU) and attended by some 27 members. John V. Hagopian (Michigan) acted as Secretary pro tem. Before the discussion began Professor Edel appointed Samuel K. Workman (Ill. Inst. of Tech.), Wayne Burns (Washington), and James Allen (Wayne) to serve on the nominating committee.

Since Mr. Adams was not present to answer questions, there was no discussion of his paper.

Mr. Hollingsworth, in opening the discussion on Conrad and Freud, called upon Mr. Moser (Berkeley) for an account of the latter's current studies in Conrad. Moser noted that Conrad's last six or seven novels seem to reveal that he was suffering from certain creative obstacles as evidenced by his weakness in depicting love affairs. His heroines seem unreal; they never surrender; they always destroy the man. Hetero-sexual love was apparently an uncongenial theme which Conrad avoided in his earlier work. In the early novels Marlowe's attractions to the sensuous East are to be taken only as metaphors (girls = East = the destruction of Western man). Marlowe lies to Kurtz's intended wife when he says that Kurtz's last words were her name -- why? Because Conrad, when confronted with a male-female relationship has to show the man fall -- the woman triumph. How is psychoanalysis to be used here? To expose some flaw in the creative temperament of the historical Conrad? But suppose the critic seeks to understand only the mind preserved in the 26 volumes of his work and isn't interested in the entire historical person, Joseph Conrad? Can he not merely observe that the author's feelings in the novels are successfully engaged with certain subjects and not with others? Ralph Mattow (Harvard) commented that although Moser wanted to appear as a critic of Conrad's work per se, he was actually engaging in a limited sort of pathography; that is, he seemed to be interested in the mind of the author.

Leon Edel, after characterizing Mr. Hollingsworth's paper as an excellent objective study of the pessimism of Freud and Conrad, inquired of Hollingsworth whether or not their pessimism seemed justified. Hollingsworth observed that many recent publications showed Freud's consideration of society to contain many difficulties. Conrad, in his way, permeated with Polish Catholicism, renounced the Christian notion of "redemption" but retained "the fall." Other nineteenth century figures -- Henry Adams, Matthew Arnold, etc. -- reacted with a powerful disillusionment against nineteenth century optimism. However, even though Hollingsworth found Freud's dependence on intellect to be inadequate as a possible instrument for freeing ourselves from the "illusion" of religion, he didn't agree with Freud's pessimism. A hindsight on events of the last half-century has simply shown him to be wrong -- we have survived longer than he thought we would. Somehow we have muddled through. [Secretary's note: In this connection see Trilling, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture.]

The discussion then turned to Louis Fraiberg's papers, "Psychology and the Writer: The Creative Process." Harry Bergholz (Michigan) challenged Fraiberg's contention that "we must know psychoanalysis as well as we know literature and criticism." Did Fraiberg really mean that a successful literary critic must undergo a personal analysis? Fraiberg responded that though this would be desirable, a few rare people would not find it an absolute necessity. An analysis would prevent the personal problems of a critic from intruding into his criticism.

John Hagopian (Michigan) observed that although it seemed that an intelligent and successfully analyzed critic would probably be better able to reach sound conclusions in psychoanalytic criticism more readily, it did not follow that critics who have not been psychoanalyzed would necessarily fail. Psychoanalysis is, after all, primarily a therapeutic technique in dealing with the mental illnesses of all kinds of people -- intelligent and ignorant. Whether or not a critic has achieved clear insight into the dynamic pattern of a work of art must be established by checking his criticism with the work of art, not by inquiring into the personal history of the critic.

Bergholz then challenged Fraiberg's contention that after the study of Leonardo da Vinci in 1910 Freud "never subsequently turned the full resources of ego psychology upon problems of art . . ." by pointing out that a 1915 paper of Freud's dealt with Lady Macbeth and with Rebecca West in Ibsen's Rosmersholm. Fraiberg countered that these were merely handy examples of emotional disturbances that Freud was using to illustrate a technical subject in psychoanalysis -- they were not analyses of literature. Furthermore, they were not intensive application of ego-psychology to the study of literary works.

A member from Berkeley (Mort?) queried Fraiberg on Freud's curious belief that De Vere was the real author of Shakespeare's plays. Wasn't this belief merely another evidence of Freud's snobbish, class-oriented prejudice that a member of the lower classes cannot attain greatness -- as shown in Moses and Monotheism? Fraiberg admitted that Freud, influenced by Looney's book on the subject, made a mistake -- a fact which even Ernest Jones in his definitive biography of Freud is unable to explain.

David Rein (Case Tech.) observed that Freud's excursions in literature were generally not convincing to the conventional scholar and invited discussion of the question, "Who's limited, Freud or the scholars?" Fraiberg replied that Freud's work was not generally as aesthetics; it served merely as support and underscoring for his clinical findings. Freud never analyzed a literary work in aesthetic terms -- merely in terms of psychoanalytic symbols and themes. Leon Edel supported Fraiberg here with the comment that although Freud was a shrewd speculator about pathography, he was not an "art" critic.

The discussion then turned to the subject of the artist's source of "inspiration." There was general agreement with Fraiberg's suggestion that the artistic process is a synthesis within the mind of the writer -- not the mere influence of external experience. It is therefore the mind of the writer that the critic must attend to. The development of ego-psychology in place of the older id-psychology -- particularly in the work of Ernst Kris -- was seen as a promising sign for psychoanalytic criticism. The reductionist process of id-psychology; that is, the identifying of universal or mythic patterns, is happily giving way to specific analyses, but Fraiberg cautioned that the process will be a low one and will require a very careful

working-out of a psychoanalytic theory of aesthetics. At this point Wayne Burns insisted that in the relation between scientific and aesthetic orders, aesthetics must come first -- we must maintain a clear distinction between psychoanalysis and literary criticism. Mr. Harderline (Kansas) suggested that the emphases would probably vary with respect to pre- and post-Freudian writers since many modern writers consciously use insights derived from psychoanalysis. But Fraiberg pointed out that this would be implicitly denying that the synthesis of psychoanalytic materials for a literary work still takes place within the mind of the writer.

Jerome Beaty (VMI) then raised the question of the so-called "poetic frenzy" reported by authors throughout history. He pointed out that Coleridge claimed to have written Kubla Khan in a sort of trance -- not a conscious process that ego-psychology could illuminate. Fraiberg, however, pointed out that, despite an author's claims, the mere act of writing involves some degree of conscious art. First drafts may have closer relation to the author's pre-conscious, but this material is almost always artistically refined in further drafts. Beaty agreed, citing the case of Middlemarch -- George Eliot claimed to have written a crucial scene of that novel without making any subsequent changes, but an examination of her manuscript shows many revisions. However, Leon Edel observed that pages of Scott's Bride of Lammermoor were taken to the printer as he composed them and that later he was unable to recognize his own work. The analogy with a dream that is forgotten seems obvious. Moser contended that Victorian writers like Scott and Eliot were nevertheless severely controlled whether they intended to be or not. Bergholz then referred to the surrealists and automatists of the early twentieth century -- could the same be said of them? Mr. Miller (Harvard) claimed that these people merely passed off their work as uncontrolled by consciousness -- but their manifestos and pronouncements seemed to show that they were fully aware of being experimentalists in control of their work. Mr. Lyon (Kansas) felt that the intentional strategies of educated modern writers have become increasingly complicated with subtleties that demand a deep knowledge of Freud by critics. Hagopian suggested that a psychological analysis of individual works of art qua art is the only legitimate activity of literary critics. The genetic process -- the study of how a work of art came into being -- is not our concern. Pathography, myth studies, and other related inquiries had better be left to psychoanalysts, anthropologists, and the like. Our work ought to be limited to the development of a critical methodology that employs the techniques of psychology in the service of literary aesthetics and with the applications of that methodology to individual works of literature. He expressed the hope that in the future papers published in LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY or presented at these meetings be restricted to this specific area.

Leon Edel closed the discussion by expressing satisfaction with the nature of the topics discussed and the cogency of the members' comments. He called for a deep and careful study of both Freudian and non-Freudian psychologists as a means of better understanding the works of writers of all ages.

In the short business meeting that followed the discussion it was decided to delegate to next year's chairman the problem of the change of status of our group within MLA from "conference" to "discussion." Also delegated to the chair were the problems of the possible change of format of the publication LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

and the subject of next year's discussion topics. It was suggested that the News Letter be used by members to announce the availability of reprints of their published articles. Professor Anderson (NYU), editor of Literature -- East and West, announced that he is seeking news and reviews, especially Jungian, for his publication. He says he has a large work in German for which he needs a reviewer.

The slate of officers submitted by the nominating committee was unanimously approved:

Chairman and Editor: Leonard F. Manheim

Associate: Eleanor B. Manheim

Steering Committee for 1956: Leon Edel

Louis I. Fraiberg

John V. Hagopian

J. V. H.

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

The absence of your Editors in Europe during the last half of 1955 made necessary the conduct of much of the editorial work for LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY and the preparations for the 1955 meeting of the Conference in Chicago by mail, and also called for the cooperation and assistance of many of our loyal members who were not enjoying a sabbatical abroad. We should like to express our gratitude to those kind souls; especially to Leon Edel, chairman of our 1955 Conference and originator of the brilliant plan of having our Conference discuss papers which were not only pre-printed in our Convention issue but also delivered in person at the Discussion Group on Literature and Society, of which he was also chairman; to John Hagopian, who acted as secretary pro tem at the Conference; to Bill Griffin, who once more stepped into the breach and supervised the production of the November, 1955, issue; to Louis Fraiberg, who acted as personal liaison officer between Paris and Chicago, with way stops at Geneva, Switzerland, and Detroit; and to James Allen, who undertook the onerous chore of handling sales and distribution of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY and of the order-petition forms at Chicago. The statement made by John H. Fisher (PMLA, Vol. LXX, no. 4, part 2, p. 19) that newsletters such as "have grown out of conferences on special topics held at MLA meetings . . . have generally been the product of the knack and energy of one individual" is effectively negated by the evidence of such cooperation and of the generosity of our contributors and bibliographers.

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Your Editor's enforced absence from the Chicago meeting last Christmas week led him to make an unusually careful (and somewhat nostalgic) examination of the program of the Seventieth Annual Meeting of MLA. He keenly regretted his inability to hear the following papers (many of which, he knows from experience, he would have missed anyway because of conflict of time and other appointments):

"Shelley's Imagery of Self-Analysis and Intrspection,"
by Ants Oras (General Topics 2: Romanticism)

"The Correspondent Breeze: A Romantic Metaphor,"
by Ian P. Watt (English Section II)

"The Triumph of Parody: The Late Works of Thomas Mann,"
by Henry Hatfield (German 5: Modern German Literature)

"The Mystery of the Critical Response,"
by Marvin Rosenberg (General Topics 7: Literature and Science)

A Symposium on Finnegans Wake (English 11: Contemporary)

"Gogol and Kafka: A Note on 'Realism' and Surrealism,"
by Victor Erlich (Slavic 1)

"Kafka's In the Penal Colony: Variations on a Theme by Mirbeau,"
by Wayne Burns (Comp. Lit. 7: Franco-German Literary Relations)

"Freud's Aesthetik," by Ludwig Marcuse (Germanic Section)

"Hamlet and Oedipus Reconsidered," by John E. Hankins
(English 5: Shakespeare)

"The Mechanical Operation: Biographical Information and the
Interpretation of Swift's Works," by Harold D. Kelling (Eng. 7: Clas-
sical).

Any of our readers who attended any of these meetings (or any others,
where the title of the papers did not reveal their relation to our
special interest) are cordially invited to contribute brief accounts,
comments, and criticisms.

* * * * *

This suggests another topic for comment. The Minutes of our
December meeting reveal that "since Mr. Adams was not present to
answer questions, there was no discussion of his paper." Now to your
Editor it seemed that Mr. Adams's paper should have been the subject
of considerable comment. Is it possible that some of our readers,
whether they were present at the Conference or not, are suffering
from a sense of frustration at their inability to comment on Mr.
Adams's methods and conclusions? Since we naturally deplore all un-
necessary feelings of frustration, we open the pages of our future
issues to the heretofore mute, but not inglorious, critics and sup-
porters of "Literature and Psychology: A Question of Significant
Form (Vol. V, no. 4, pp. 67-72).

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Professor Fred Dudley of Washington State, in sending in his
1956 subscription, enclosed a clipping from a Spokane, Washington,
newspaper for 3 February 1956. Beneath a photograph of Dr. Leonard
Schneider, assistant professor of psychology and director of the human
relations center at Washington State, appears the announcement that
Professor Schneider will teach a course in "Psychology in Literature,"
using "fiction writings [sic] as a source for understanding people.

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And finally, in response to the suggestion at the Conference
that announcement be made in these pages of the availability of
reprints of published articles, your Editor announces that he has
a supply of offprints of "The Law as 'Father' in the Later Works
of Dickens." It will be sent to any reader who provides a three-
cent stamp. The explication by your Editors of Baudelaire's
"Irrémédiable" is not available, since The Explicator could supply
neither offprints nor additional copies of the issue in which the
article appeared.

E. B. M.
L. F. M.

A FREUDIAN VIEW OF JONATHAN SWIFT

There are few characters in the history of literature with minds more complex and elusive than Jonathan Swift's. If the psyche of Swift is ever to be thoroughly understood, it can only be by means of a comprehensive and detailed study by a competent clinician who will have studied the internal evidence of the written works as well as the biographical evidence. The present essay attempts to sum up the clinicians' work and supplement it with internal evidence available to the literary student. Contrary to the belief of some critics, the psychodynamic interpretation of Swift is of the greatest importance in the understanding of his work, and in placing the tremendous achievement of Swift in the sum total of human achievement. The critic cannot neglect the private and personal, even the secret, element in Jonathan Swift. Swift was both the victim and the beneficiary of a terrific oneness, which conditioned his life, his achievement, and his fame. Every critic has been baffled at some point by Swift, who delighted in mystifying the world, and a critical view of the findings of depth psychology will clear up at least some of the causes of this bafflement.

Three Freudian studies of Swift that are of value, those of Ferenczi, Grant Duff, and Karpman¹, all suffer from inadequate preparation and a tendency to hypothetical conclusions. Ferenczi, taking as evidence the inversions of size in Books I and II of Gulliver's Travels, which he calls "microptic and macroptic illusory distortions," concludes that Swift suffered from "genital inadequacy"; he finds the cause of this condition in Swift's lack of a father and of a normal father-identification. Grant Duff diagnoses Swift as an oral- or anal-sadistic type, lays much stress on the evidence of Swift's notorious coprophilia, and assigns as cause the journey to England which separated Swift from his mother at the age of one year. Grant Duff sees in this journey, and in the return trip at the age of four, the source of Swift's passionate interest in travel; in the traumas associated with these experiences he finds the source of many of the fantasies of Gulliver's Travels. Glumdalclitch, Gulliver's nurse in Book II of the Travels, has her origin in Swift's own nurse, he believes. Karpman has studied the fantasies of Gulliver's Travels for the purpose of showing that the imaginative inventions of Swift are essentially "neurotic fantasies," and he describes the nature of Swift's alleged abnormality as paraphilia: he believes that Swift in his erotic life substituted coprophilia for more normal erotic satisfactions. Krafft-Ebing has placed Swift in the category of those suffering from "sexual anaesthesia," an absolute incapacity for normal sexual feeling.

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- 1 Sander Ferenczi, "Gulliver Phantasies," International Journal of Psychoanalysis 9 (1928), pp. 283-300. I. F. Grant Duff, "A One-Sided Sketch of Jonathan Swift," Psychoanalytic Quarterly 6 (April, 1937), pp. 238-259. Ben Karpman, "Neurotic Traits of Jonathan Swift, as Revealed by Gulliver's Travels," Psychoanalytic Review 29 (1942), pp. 26-45, 165-184.
 - 2 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, 12th German edition, 1929, translated and quoted by Maxwell Gold, Swift's Marriage to Stella, Cambridge, 1937, pp. 128ff.

The illusions of size that fascinated Ferenczi are now known to represent a normal experience of babyhood, along with an associated projective wish-fulfillment. Nor does his finding of masculine "inadequacy" stand up against the evidence of Swift's life. In his dealings with women Swift always showed himself master of the occasions, and if, when put to the jump, as he may have been by Vanessa, he may have felt like Gulliver assailed by the female Yahoo ("I was never in my life so terribly frightened"), yet on the whole one cannot believe that a fear of women or a consciousness of sexual inadequacy was central in the complex of Swift's psyche. He does not conform to the usual syndrome of sex inadequacy; nor does he exhibit any yearning for a sexual relation. On the contrary, as will be shown, Swift was not only aware of the special nature of his sexual incapacity, he had accepted it and had built secure defenses.

Grant Duff's interpretation is acceptable so far as it goes, but it is not presented as a comprehensive study, and it contains some poorly based hypotheses. Karpman seems to be mainly concerned to prove that Swift was a neurotic man, with a mind full of dirty thoughts; such a judgment does not read well against the historical facts of Swift's career. While it is difficult to contravene the argument that Swift's famous "originality" -- his imaginative and inventive powers -- was often juvenile (how else to account for his two centuries of popularity with children?), nonetheless this view overlooks the mature content of the work, the satire on politics, society, and man. Nor does it explain why these fantasies did not remain the ineffective daydreams of a thwarted man, but were transmuted into art. This is a problem that baffled Freud himself; Freud perceived the resemblance between neurotic fantasy and artistic imagination, but could find no principle by which to differentiate one from the other. We can say at this point only that a fantasy externalized as art can no longer be labeled "neurotic," for neurosis implied repression.³ Krafft-Ebing's finding of "sexual anaesthesia" does fit the historical facts and the internal evidence, but we must enter the caution that this was a developed condition in Swift, not a hereditary or constitutional defect.

Two points emerge from these clinical diagnoses, neither of which is novel, neither of which has gone unobserved by critics and students. They are Swift's coprophilia and his frigidity. Swift's downright aversion to sex was noted as early as Sheridan and Orrery, and later by Leslie Stephen, as well as more recently by Aldous Huxley, Gold, Bertram, and Quintana. The fascination that the elementary processes of the bathroom held for Swift is evident to every reader; anyone who is sceptical on this point need be referred only to the appalling collection of data, from Gulliver's Travels alone, which appears in Karpman's article. To many mature readers it is mystifying, and Samuel Johnson's honest bewilderment, expressed in his Life of Swift, represents a common reaction to this element in Swift's work:

The greatest difficulty that occurs, in analysing his character, is to discover by what depravity of intellect he took delight in revolting ideas, from which almost every other mind shrinks with disgust. The ideas of pleasure, even when criminal, may solicit the imagination; but what has disease, deformity, and filth, upon which the mind can be allured to dwell?

³ = = = = =
See also Lionel Trilling, "Art and Neurosis," in The Liberal Imagination (New York, 1950), and Edmund Glover, Freud or Jung (New York, 1950), pp. 184-185.

. What is the answer to Johnson's question? What experience of a traumatic kind did Swift undergo as a child that left him with these two psychic abnormalities of sexual coldness and coprophilia? A reasonable reconstruction can be made from the facts on the basis of present psychiatric knowledge. The vital source is the autobiographical fragment, generally accepted by scholars as trustworthy, for this is our only source for knowledge of the earliest period of Swift's life. It tells the strange story of his abduction by a fond nurse.

He was born in Dublin, on Saint Andrew's day, in the year 1667; and when he was a year old, an event happened to him that seems very unusual; for his nurse, who was a woman of Whitehaven, being under an absolute necessity of seeing one of her relations, who was then extremely sick, and from whom she expected a legacy, and being at the same time extremely fond of the infant, she stole him on ship-board unknown to his mother and uncle, and carried him with her to Whitehaven, where he continued for almost three years. For, when the matter was discovered, his mother sent orders by all means not to hazard a second voyage, till he could be better able to bear it. The nurse was so careful of him, that before he returned he had learnt to spell; and by the time that he was three years old he could read any chapter of the Bible.⁴

Two facts about the nurse are significant: her exceeding fondness for the young Jonathan, and her efficiency in teaching him to read by the age of three to three-and-a-half (there is a manuscript correction on this point). The third fact relevant to the situation is the passionate and absurd denunciation of caresses by parents and nurses, even of the mildest kind, that occurs in both the second and fourth books of Gulliver's Travels. Swift speaks here exactly like a man condemning his own upbringing; it is reasonable to suppose that these prohibitions are a clue to his early experience with the nurse.

The anonymous nurse, evidently a frustrated mother, had developed a love for the child, and took the rash step of stealing him away from his mother. She felt justified in doing this, because Mrs. Swift, already a widow, was herself relatively indifferent to the child. (She allowed it to be kept abroad for three years on a rather shallow pretext, and later in life she went to Leicester in England, leaving Jonathan to the care of his well-to-do uncle Godwin.) Once abroad with the child, the nurse felt keenly her duty to rear the child properly, so that she would not be subject to reproach. She was severe in training him, and succeeded by rigorous methods in teaching him to read at an astonishingly early age -- a skill that contributed to Swift's later eminence in letters. Being fond of him at the same time, she overwhelmed him with caresses, which may well have had an erotic tinge, if she was single and emotionally starved. In the training of little Jonathan in the necessary processes of the bathroom, there was a similar combination of severity in exactions alternating with caresses of a faintly lascivious character. This treatment came from one who was partly a stranger, for the nurse never usurped the emotional place of the mother in Swift's consciousness.

The result was the syndrome of so-called anal fixation that Swift later evidences. Swift was not motivated by a simple "hatred of bowels," as Aldous Huxley supposed; the complex was more intricate

than that. Disgust -- which the clinicians say originates with this experience⁵ -- he absorbed from his teacher, and it became, as critics like Eliot and Quintana have noted, a dominant emotion in his life and work. He also learned, indeed overlearned, a passion for cleanliness; he had an almost morbid fear of "falling into nastiness" in old age. "He washed himself," said Samuel Johnson, "with Oriental scrupulosity." This drive toward cleanliness had the most diverse effects: it was sublimated into a passionate thirst for truth and justice, and it caused him to cleanse and purge his prose style until it became a miracle of force and concision. He absorbed also from his nurse-teacher a lordly and punitive attitude toward the world which emerged in the relentless satirist, and a kind of sense of absolute authority, like all-judging Jove, that gave Swift later the confidence to condemn the whole of humanity. The caresses not coming from one whom he recognized as mother, he rejected them and thus laid the basis for his sexual coldness, but the erotic aura of these caresses was transferred in his mind to the processes that were then of erotic interest to him. Most important of all to Swift's psyche was the learned hatred of all animal processes and functions -- the foundation of his "misanthropy" and "misogyny," of his rejection of and his alienation from the whole animal heritage of mankind.

Along with the attitudes growing out of his identification with the nurse, we can recognize in the mature Swift the attitudes of the boy himself. There is the love of concealment, which caused Swift to hide the authorship of everything he wrote except one piece, which emerges in the clothes metaphor in A Tale of a Tub, and which appears as a theme in numerous places, notably in the Fourth Book of Gulliver's Travels, where the main theme of the story is Gulliver's attempt to conceal his identity with the filthy Yahoos. There is the attitude of mock innocence, dominant in The Drapier's Letters and A Modest Proposal, observable throughout his work, and acted out in full in the episode of the fire in the Queen's palace in Book I of Gulliver's Travels. There is the love of argument, and the willingness to argue any proposition from the most untenable ground. There is the love of pretense, mixed with mockery, which is one of the defenses of rebellion against authority. There is the arrogant defiance of authority, and a love of exposing the faults of those in power. There is the sense of mischief that pervades all Swift's humorous work. All these attitudes, matured and developed, contribute to the charm and variety of his writings.

Besides these attitudes that can be traced to the familiar processes of identification and reaction-formation, we must take account of those due to projection. The mock-pastoral poems, like "Cassinus and Peter," where lovers are disillusioned upon discovering that their brides are subject to elementary biological necessities, are of course ridiculous in the charge brought against women, and D. H. Lawrence has taken Swift furiously to task for this inability to accept biological fact. Dirtiness, to Swift, was the most serious of accusations: women were culpable when unclean, like the maids of honor in Gulliver's Travels, Book II, and to Swift, in fact, this was the primal sin of womanhood. Characteristically he wrote to Varina that he preferred

5 See A. A. Brill, in Sandor Lorand (ed.), Psychoanalysis Today (New York, 1944), pp. 183-184.

cleanliness to beauty in women. And not only women, but the human race itself is unclean; the Yahoos have a "strange disposition to nastiness and dirt, whereas there appears to be a natural love of cleanliness in all other animals."

Young Jonathan refused to be cowed, refused -- at least on the conscious level of the ego -- the burden of guilt imposed upon him, and projected it onto others. That he did so was in one sense his salvation, for by thus avoiding a conscious sense of guilt he retained his personal pride and perhaps escaped a paralyzing neurosis. Swift partly knew how he had done it: his own description of the process of projection of the burden of guilt during the years of maturity is brilliant.

There are but three Ways for a Man to revenge himself of a censorious World: To despise it; to return the like; or to endeavour to live so as to avoid it. The first of these is usually pretended; the last is almost impossible; the universal Practice is for the second.⁶

If his rebellion had the fortunate effect of preserving his self-esteem, it had another that was disastrous. Although he accepted the general emotion of disgust, he stubbornly refused to relinquish the sensual pleasure in the products of one's body that is normal at that early period of life; hence his paraphilia and the coprology in his writings. His sensual development was arrested on the anal-erotic level.

If Swift had been returned at the age of four to a loving father and mother, the story might have been different. Half an orphan, deprived of any dynamic emotional contact with his mother, Swift in his writings presents no mother-figure nor father-figure that is traceable to his relation to his own parents. Instead we find the image of the caretaker-nurse, a recognized substitute, like Glumdalclitch or the master Houyhnhnm, with their loveless virtues of benevolence, reason, temperance, justice. Stella, to whom he was both pastor and master, he fashioned after his favorite ego-ideal, disciplining her from youth in courage, truth, cleanliness, companionability -- boyish virtues. Swift never entered the Oedipal stage of affective growth; thus his life did not offer him the emotional basis for sexual love. This emotional vacuum, coming on top of a sensual fixation, produced his well-known anaesthesia to love. His emotional energy was diverted to that saeva indignatio from which he confessed that he was never free, and his sensual impulses were diverted to fakery, mockery, and fantasy, tinged with coprology. Swift is not to be regarded as either a Stoic or an ascetic, for in these philosophies is involved a conscious suppression of sensual impulses, whereas in Swift such impulses, except for certain infantile ones, are, on the conscious level, simply absent to a rare degree.

Of Swift's love life, of which an amazing quantity has been written in view of the fact that it was nonexistent, the outlines are fairly clear. He appears to have contemplated marriage as a young man, and he proposed to Jane Waring in an extant letter which Pons

6 "Thoughts on Various Subjects," The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, edited by Herbert Davis (Oxford, 1939), vol. 1, p. 243.

has analyzed as an unconscious fake -- the performance of a brilliant youth posturing histrionically in the attitudes of romantic love.⁷ With marriage in mind, he may have made some kind of trial of his sexual powers -- a matter in which spirited youth does not tolerate uncertainty or ignorance. The old story of his leaving Kilroot because of an attack on a young lady, though not generally credited by scholars, may contain elements of symbolic if not strictly factual truth; an unsuccessful attempt of this sort is precisely the kind most likely to be publicized. At any rate, the second, subsequent letter to Jane Waring was a cool insult setting up impossible conditions and calculated to repel, if we trust Pons, who concludes, "Swift n'aima pas Varina." Later Swift reveals an entire self-knowledge regarding his sexual powers in the oblique, ironic remarks in his letters: "I have not your faculty for increasing the population"; "I am as fit for matrimony as invention"; and he appears to have taken his close friends into his confidence.

Stella he conditioned to his own ideal of womanhood, and required and obtained from her a curious brother-sister relation of devotion and affection without overt sensuality. It is beyond belief that this thirty-year association did not rest on at least a tacit understanding of what its nature must be, and that marriage, if it took place, was unconsummated. The "Character of Stella," written right after her death, is comparable to the early sections of *In Memoriam* in its desolate blankness of spirit; one of the saddest documents in literature, it is clearly the epitaph of a love without fulfillment. Swift's mental and moral deterioration began at this time, a fact that illuminates his dependence on the nurse-image.

On the one occasion when to our knowledge he was faced down on the sexual issue -- by Vanessa -- Swift beat a cool and calculated retreat to long-prepared defenses. The story is clear in outline beneath the ironies of *Cadenus and Vanessa*. Swift attempts to divert the foe with the timeworn excuses of the bored husband, age and business, and with mock appeals for Platonic purity, but there comes finally the clear confession, dropped into the poem with Swiftian cunning for him who does not run when he reads: "Cadenus . . . understood not what was love." This poem can be read rightly only with its double irony in mind, for Swift's contention that he had wished a Platonic relation while Vanessa demanded a romantic one is exactly true, though Swift avoids an open confession of his deficiency by clothing the truth with a deceptive, mocking tone, making his true position as a misunderstood man appear like a pretense. It is difficult today to see in this poem the want of gallantry that distressed Victorians like Thackeray.

Like Francis Bacon, and indeed like many men who carry a juvenile attitude that they think to be intensely masculine, Swift honestly disbelieved in the reality of sexual love, "that ridiculous passion which has no being but in play-books and romances." To him love was a subject alternately for ridicule, scorn, or refined disgust. His favorite mode for mingling these moods was the mock pastoral. The pastoral names he gave to his women are satirical in intent. He delighted in taking the pastoral form, which had always been deeply

⁷ Emile Pons, *La Jeunesse de Swift*, analyzes the letters in detail. See especially pp. 199-201.

infused with sexual feeling and with the mood of dallying, and which in Swift's time was ending the run of popularity it had enjoyed since Guarini, and mocking its spirit and style; frequently the mock-pastoral poems end in some revolting bit of scatology. The very word "love" had intensely personal connotations for Swift: his "The Problem: That my Lord B---ly stinks, when he's in Love" is significant, and his terrific denunciation of Wharton is epitomized in the words "love of money, love of power, love of self."

It was not only to the immediate experience of sexual love that Swift was indifferent; he was likewise immune to what once were called the "higher" realms of experience that are open only to those who have ascended to love in its spiritual expressions. Swift must remain in the second rank of genius because he never set foot on the road of development that leads to such heights of experience as are recorded in the Paradise, The Tempest, and the Saint Matthew Passion. His indifference to the spirit of poetry; to human and divine love; to idealism, mysticism, and ecstasy; to abstract science and metaphysics; to institutions and the creative trends of history -- all these reveal to the psychologist how diverse are the higher expressions of the creative sensual impulse.

Swift's oneness, his scorn of love and all its works, is of interest because of its peculiar absoluteness. To him one half of human nature and experience was a blank, a mystery, a fraud. Here is the cause in his personal history of his alleged misanthropy and misogyny, his utter want of sentiment (noted by Bernard Shaw), his total lack of feeling for sensuous beauty or aesthetic form, his "bitter indignation" (the repudiation of all positive values in sensual men), his authentic Puritanism. The negative consequences of Swift's oneness may be summed up as an imperviousness to sensuous beauty, an insensitiveness to all the higher forms of religion, a pessimistic view of history, and an anaesthesia to the higher realms of philosophy and science.

It is to this simple, but absolute, view of humankind that we must look for the origin of Swift's "philosophy." Pons has seen in Swift's work a pervading "animal myth," a dominant symbol and theme that consists in isolating, demonstrating, and condemning the animal in man. Quintana uses the phrase "moral relapse" to describe this dichotomy. It is remarkable to find Swift in his time, long before Darwin and Freud, taking a pessimistic view of man as a "topsy-turvy creature, his animal faculties perpetually mounted on his rational;" yet such a view did in fact fit readily into contemporary philosophy. The antitheses of mind and body, of reason and emotion, are prominent in Descartes and Spinoza, and Locke had made of mind a reasoning machine. Swift differs from contemporary and modern thought, however, in his total rejection of animal man, of sentiment and sensuality. Swift's philosophy really consists of little more than this primary intuition, which is really not philosophical but is a private sentiment, not unlike the misanthropy of Robinson Jeffers. One need only read Professor Quintana's digest of Clara Marburg's study of the philosophy of Sir William Temple to see that Swift, who regarded all organized attempts at philosophical system with a nihilistic contempt, took what he needed for a usable intellectual rationalization of the world from Temple.⁸ He took one important exception,

8 Ricardo Quintana, The Mind and Art of Jonathan Swift, 1936, pp. 10-24.

however: he did not accept Temple's libertin view of the natural goodness of man. Swift could no more believe, like Temple, Franklin, and Rousseau, in the natural goodness of man than he could be a Whig or "enthusiast."

It is idle to speak of Swift as a neurotic, for this word implies frustration, and Swift was not a frustrated man. It is too easy to read Swift's career against petty pseudo-Freudian orthodoxy, such as prevailed particularly in the 1920's, and to condemn him, as Huxley and Lawrence did, for failure in sexual fulfillment. Such fulfillment has not always been seen as a necessity in human society, and Swift did not so see it. He knew himself, was reconciled to his own nature, and worked out for himself a life which, though not so humanly complete as that of Sophocles or Bach, was nevertheless a successful battle with reality. Unlike the neurotic who dams up his energies within himself, Swift obtained release by sharing his perceptions with the world through art. Art is not a neurotic activity, but rather -- because, like sex, it involves both release and communion -- it is a form of self-fulfillment. And laughter is a positive value as well as love. Swift has suffered from both unjustified denunciation and needless sympathy.

Swift's true greatness as a satirist and humorist is intimately allied with the oneness of his personality. The source of his satiric power is perhaps to be found precisely in his rare separation from normal human motives. The quality of detachment, of emotional disengagement from one's subject, is indispensable to satire. Swift was able to look on much of the spectacle of human life almost as an alien, and say, like Puck,

Shall we their fond pageant see?
Lord, what fools these mortals be!

Lust, greed, and conscious cruelty were foreign to Swift, and he remained virtually free of involvement in some of the perennial sins of human passion. His unusual disengagement also is the foundation for his development as a humorist, for it may well be that the attitude appropriate to comedy and humor can be attained only when this condition of moral and emotional detachment is fulfilled. Swift never entered into life in the manner of total engagement, and his worldly career was hampered by his levity.

But though we may speak of disengagement, we cannot speak of ignorance, for Swift, with his almost inhuman detachment, observed human life and behavior with relentless accuracy. The study of human behavior, undimmed by sentiment, was the great pre-occupation of his intellectual life. Even though we may discern a sublimated voyeurism at the base of Swift's ceaseless study of the activity of the human species, from chambermaids to prime ministers, we are no less astonished, on finishing Gulliver's Travels, that any man could have observed mankind so minutely and so accurately.

Swift's satire has a definite form and structure which is personal, and can be related, though not at all points, to what we know of his complex character. The Fourth Book of Gulliver's Travels, the best known if not the greatest of his works, exhibits all the characteristic forms of his satire. Gulliver is the central character, the persona, who is projected between the author and the reader in most of Swift's works, as the Drapier in the Drapier's Letters or as the astrologer in the Partridge papers, and who in Gulliver's Travels

has the neutral and passive character that one's own personality has in dreams. This persona always has an air of mock ingenuousness.

The structure of the satire is built on an extremely simple inversion of reality. In the Fourth Book the logical presuppositions are two: "if horses ruled the world, rather than men," and "if man were seen in his naked reality as an animal, stripped of the refinements of culture." The details of the satire evolve from the working out of these two assumptions; the result is the Houyhnhnms and the Yahoos and the relation between them. Swift's satires are commonly based on such a single violation of reality: if human beings were six inches high (the First Book); if the world were to come to an end (What Happened in London); if human beings were acceptable as food (A Modest Proposal); if scientists and reformers ruled the world (Book III of Gulliver's Travels).

This primary illogical supposition is developed and extrapolated with an amazing inventive pertinacity in the tracing out of consequences. (One critic was thrown by the horses sewing in Houyhnhnmland.) In the fantastic detail with which Swift works out his satires the Freudian can often see symbolism drawn from Swift's unconscious memories. Combined with this illogic, however, and set against it is a logical development that comes in touch with reality. This can be observed in Book IV in the brilliant argument of the Houyhnhnm master by which he persuades Gulliver of his identity with the Yahoos. In his logical reasoning Swift shows a concept of reason that has little in common with the urbane common sense of contemporary rationalists; his logic is more like the remorseless logic of a child, which ignores qualifications. Thus to Swift parental affection and mourning for the dead are irrational, and hence to be banished. It was this uncompromising rationality of Swift, however, that enabled him, in such passages as the condemnation of war and imperialism in Gulliver's Travels, or the masterly economics and sociology of A Modest Proposal, to arrive frequently at a more permanent and philosophical truth than his contemporaries.

The rhetorical structure of the former work is fused in a single effort of persuasion that is magnificently realized. Swift seeks to achieve his aim of enveloping mankind with disgust through gradually persuading his reader of the identity of the Yahoos, a symbol of animal man, with Gulliver, l'homme moyen sensuel européen. He does this with infinite art, which seldom fails with any reader. The Yahoos are introduced as strange creatures, and Gulliver regards them with due horror. Then ensues the gradual discovery by Gulliver of their human resemblance, which he endeavors to conceal, first from himself, and then from his Houyhnhnm master. A tone of mocking irony prevails in these scenes of discovery. His master, a creature of reason who cannot understand untruth, proves to Gulliver point by point, in a brilliant train of dialectic, that the Europeans, whom Gulliver has described to him in detail, are in all essential points identical with the Yahoos. The most damning piece of evidence, of course, is the attempted assault of the female Yahoo upon Gulliver, treated with characteristic disgust and mockery. Gulliver accepts the inexorable verdict of reason, and before and during his deserved exile for being a member of the human race he undergoes a change of mind which brings him to accept the contemptuous view which the Houyhnhnms take of humanity. In the last chapter the argument is given a further twist by Gulliver's emerging as an earnest crackpot, back once more in England, communing with his horses in the barn. Throughout the Book

there is a similar alternation between angry condemnation and ridiculous imposture that keeps the reader spinning. The rhetorical effort, however, is an entire success, and the reader accepts the conclusion, recognizing both the human truth and the nonsense. It is hardly necessary to point out the similarities between Gulliver's story -- his discovery, guilt, submission, and projection -- and the early traumatic experience of Swift that has been outlined.

In his great pieces Swift usually aims to overwhelm his opponent with disgust by thus bringing to bear upon him a superb, monolithic structure of persuasion based on a fantastic logic. The Drapier's Letters and the Modest Proposal are aimed in this way at English exploitation and Irish folly. The deists are the victims in the Argument Against Abolishing Christianity; the dissenters in the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit; the whole crew of religious dogmatists and schismatics, from the Reformation onwards, in A Tale of a Tub. Swift's dialectic and rhetoric were of cultural origin, for they doubtless represent the use to which he put the training in scholasticism against which he rebelled in Trinity College.

Not only is the humor and satire in Swift interwoven with the structure of his character, his peternatural moral insight is likewise a consequence of his disengagement from normal motives. It was this disengagement that gave him his superhuman clarity of vision into human motives. He outranged his contemporaries, even Voltaire, in the depth of his penetration. No liberal clergyman of today could quarrel with the implied judgment of the vanity of religious dissension in A Tale of a Tub. The nascent corruptions of partisan politics were clearly set forth by Swift. His judgments on capitalism, war, imperialism, feminine education, and many other subjects anticipated public opinion by one or two centuries. In the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit he makes a shrewd and distinctly Freudian analysis of the fanatic enthusiastic evangelists; long before Elmer Gantry and Rome Hanks he rudely and bluntly ascribed their emotional ecstasies to the impulses of sex.⁹

Swift's insight was a direct view into what we now call the Unconscious, sexually allied with the motives of men, and this insight was an immediate result of his own inviolable divorcement from many of these motives. He reaches his greatest height in his cold, bitter attacks on the primary sins of lying, fraud, and cruelty. The term "sadist" has been applied to Swift in a clinical sense; it cannot be applied in a moral sense, for Swift was not governed by the destructive aims of the paranoid. Indeed it is above all by reason of his unremitting hatred of all cruelty that he will continue to be revered as a great humanist.

Donald R. Roberts
Department of English
Norwich University

9 In Mechanical Operation this idea is very clearly and openly developed, not without indelicacy. The concluding paragraph is almost a statement of the libido theory, especially when considered in conjunction with what precedes (religious enthusiasm arising from erotic excitement):

Too intense a Contemplation is not the Business of Flesh and Blood; it must by the necessary Course of Things, in a little Time, let go its Hold, and fall into Matter. Lovers, for the sake of Celestial Converse, are but another sort of Platonicks, who pretend to see Stars and Heaven in Ladies Eyes, and to look or think no lower; but the same Pit is provided for both; and they seem a perfect Moral to the Story of that Philosopher, who, while his Thoughts and Eyes were fixed upon the Constellations, found himself seduced by his Lower Parts into a Ditch.

BOOK REVIEW

Phyllis Greenacre, M. D. -- SWIFT AND CARROLL. A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF TWO LIVES. * New York, International Universities Press, 1955. Pp. 306. \$5.00

Studies of artists and historical personalities have from the beginning held a special position in psychoanalytic writing. Freud's own contributions to this genre may well have set the pattern. Psychoanalytic biographies became a part of the tradition of psychoanalysis, manifesting, as it were, its universalistic premises. These biographies have also come in for a considerable measure of criticism. If some of the more excited protestations be discounted -- that art becomes debased when it is reduced to the ordinary drives and needs of living -- there still remain several rather critical problems germane to the approach itself. It is not possible therefore to review a study of this kind without at the same time considering, at least to some extent, the principal problems which psychoanalytic biographies or pathographies have in common. It is not the theory of psychoanalysis which is in question here. The "pathophile" slant of its concepts has contributed the same primary problem to the psychological interpretation of literature which makes itself felt in the whole psychoanalytic theory of personality. The problems which we have in mind here concern the application of clinical interpretation, the method of immediacy par excellence, to events which lie in the past, and with data which refer to their subject only in varying degrees of indirection.

The title speaks of "psychoanalytic studies of two lives." Discovering the unconscious aims of these lives, is indeed the aim of the book. Jonathan Swift's and Lewis Carroll's contributions to literature become relevant only in that they offer an opportunity for recognizing the unconscious needs and conflicts of the two writers, as dreams and fantasies would have done in the case of persons more directly accessible. Greenacre's essay on Swift appears more characteristic of her approach, but also more controversial. That on Carroll is more smoothly written, more consistent, and more convincing in its conclusions. In addition to the distance in time which in Swift's case creates the problem of appreciating modes of living and thinking already remote from our own, there is perhaps also a difference in affinity, so that one essay suggests itself as a labor of love, the other merely one of interest.

One will ask what Swift and Carroll have in common that they were chosen for what is obviously a unitary purpose; for at first the combination seems a rather arbitrary one. As one reads about them in juxtaposition it quickly becomes clear that both not only created extraordinary fantasies which proved to be enduring works of art, but that their lives too, in spite of obvious differences, show surprising similarities. Both were churchmen but participated little in priestly functions. Neither had taken orders quite by conviction. Both remained unmarried, and in their conduct gave clear evidence of the symptomatic expression of unresolved neurotic conflict. The stories on which the fame of both rests concern journeys into a never-never land of fantasy, but express, as one might have expected, in artful elaboration and disguise, the needs and problems of their au-

Editor's note. It is only fair to Professor Roberts to note that this work was not available at the time his article was written.

thors. Both men had also in common marked hypochondriacal preoccupations, agreeing, for instance, over the span of more than a century, on the healthful advantages of extensive walking. Both were most effective when they responded to their impression of the world not directly but through fantasy and artfully inverted logic -- Swift in satire and grim persiflage, Carroll "through gentle gruesomeness, always under the umbrella of nonsense" (p. 261). Both men had keen incisive intellects and an extraordinary ability with words, so that even their most bizarre productions oscillate between the sheer exuberance of fantasy and high abstraction. Last but not least, Gulliver's and Alice's adventures have in common that the story depends on changes in the size of the hero's, or heroine's, body. Dr. Greenacre proposes that this reflects, in many variations, a fundamental problem in the body image of both writers, and that it thus offers us a major clue to the neurotic deformity of their characters.

Dr. Greenacre assumes that Swift retained from his unusual childhood a fundamental mystification as to the relationships of parents and children, and a need for the emotional security of a family and for the love of a father, so that in later life he inclined to withdraw into himself when these needs were met with frustration or rejection. Dr. Greenacre conjectures that while the nursemaid was devoted to him, she still did not give him the immediate physical affection which a child of his age needs. Instead she stressed cleanliness and bodily control too harshly, and pushed the child's intellectual development too early. From the impact of the intimate relationship with the nursemaid, Swift, according to Dr. Greenacre's construction, retained a confusion of the identity of his own body, and a fascinated interest in the female body which later on led to a loathing disdain for its uncleanness. In the three known love affairs of his life Swift was unable to tolerate any close physical or emotional relationship, but tried instead to persuade women to make themselves over in appearance and conduct into something like an intermediate sex. Both in his life and in his writing he was overly concerned with the polarities of cleanliness and dirt, with health and with what seemed to threaten it, never being able to trust and fully to accept his own body and its needs.

"The character and circumstances of the kidnapping nurse who cared for him during the formative years, from one to four or so, must have been extremely important in molding the beginning of personality in this little boy" (p. 84). One can hardly doubt that when one considers how important this period of development is for any child. It is a different story with Dr. Greenacre's conjecture about the nurse's treatment of young Swift. Why should she, who most likely was a simple person with next to no education (as would have been the case with almost anybody in the servant class at that time), have "emphasize[d] good behavior and cultivate[d] his intellect" (p. 84)? Moreover, the reason for the abduction has apparently remained obscure. One would surmise, with Dr. Greenacre's concurrence that the nursemaid must have liked the child Jonathan enough to take him along with her and to risk all kinds of trouble, or at any rate, to take upon herself more work and care than she would have had without him. It would then seem more plausible that the nursemaid should have harmed the child with too much unrestrained love rather than with too little.

Nor is it at all convincing that Swift's distorted notions of female anatomy (themselves inferred from Gulliver's experiences) remained distorted because he missed the "greater ease and familiarity with girls and women which most boys experience in their family relationships" (p. 87). These conditions, however, do not always have the effect which is attributed to them here. Not only would a large portion of all the analytic case material ever published seem to attest the contrary; but so does also Dr. Greenacre's other essay on Lewis Carroll. The lower classes of a social hierarchy are usually characterized by greater instinctual directness and by the absence of restrictive ceremonial when gratification of these appetites is sought. It would be much more plausible if Swift had, under the care of the nursemaid, acquired a more natural attitude toward the feelings and functions of his body than he might have among the middle-class constraints of his own family. Instead of attributing so much to the abduction it would be more consistent with the logic of Dr. Greenacre's argument to regard the child Swift's return to his mother (who may have left him again after a few months, although this, too, is not at all certain) as a situation of traumatic complexity. There is no inherent reason to believe that the child's identity was harmed by being with the nursemaid, except that such an assumption is necessary if the behavior of the adult is to be accounted for. In point of fact, Swift was with the nursemaid from the moment he first grew beyond the passive receptivity of the infant -- if not before -- through the most significant stages of gradual differentiation and organization. Was she not the center of his subjective world so that confusion and disorder should really have begun when she disappeared in his fourth or fifth year -- or did she?

Dr. Greenacre argues that the past events of childhood can be "reconstructed from known characteristics, problems and repetitive actions supported by the memory traces which remain in so many disguised forms" (p. 107) and claims "that the experienced psychoanalyst knows just as definitely as the internist observing later sequelae of tuberculosis or poliomyelitis, that the deformity is the result of specific acts upon the young organism" (p. 107). She thinks that we are usually less cautious in reasoning from known experience out of respect for "factual" data, though this may be "mis-remembered and subjectively distorted." Dr. Greenacre forgets, however, that most of her own reconstructions rest on such factual data. To be sure, they are of the most indefinite kind, inevitably mis-remembered and subjectively distorted, as they come from a variety of nearly anonymous observers and often passed from one person to another before even being recorded. Yet for the "known characteristics, problems and repetitive actions" of the person whose childhood is to be reconstructed, Dr. Greenacre is entirely dependent on them. Not even the most extensive experience will be able to make them very reliable under these circumstances. There is much in analytic writing which seems to contradict the possibility of reconstruction beyond the correct indication of general trends, of the outline and constellation of events. At any rate, reconstruction is certainly a function of the amount, continuity, and homogeneity of the data available for it, and a comparison between the sequelae of tuberculosis and of the subtle complexity of forces impinging upon growth in innumerable ways is really a little specious.

Jonathan Swift was a man of power, a champion of Church, of truth of a view of man's history and promise which his own age saw threatened and finally destroyed. He hated mankind, at times with a savagery scarce equalled by Shakespeare's Timon, for he saw what man

might be and should be and how, out of pride and passion and plain inanity, man betrayed himself. He was both attracted to and repelled by women: the tragedy of his own life is entangled with the tragedies of Stella and Vanessa.

Dr. Greenacre suggests that Swift was subject to a strong anal fixation, brought on by the severe toilet training of his abducting nurse; that he never achieved psychologically adult sexuality; and that he exhibited the character structure of the transvestite, and symptoms of a severe castration complex. Though one may wish to quarrel with some of the reasoning -- as, for example, that Swift's entry into the church is even remotely presumptive proof of transvestite inclinations -- it does seem both interesting and largely plausible. But the same cannot be said of Dr. Greenacre's use of biographical data. Here she proceeds with a kind of question-begging unconcern which seems admissible to neither psychology nor literary criticism. And, as her work is read by students of literature who are not themselves familiar with the psychoanalytic process, this second aspect of her method may have the strongest influence and obscure the merits of her psychological interpretations.

She fails to document important and sometimes dubious points. Swift, she says on p. 32, "had already attacked religion and the church like an atheist." Where? "Swift decided that he would not let himself love again" (p. 37). What is the evidence? "As soon as one [of the two Hesters] was gone, he began to decline" (p. 55). What is the evidence?

Dr. Greenacre handles her sources arbitrarily. They are many indeed, and she is to be praised for reading so thoroughly on her subject, but she treats good and bad alike, calling on whatever supports her theory and rejecting the rest, even when the latter are reliable and the former not. For example, on p. 26 she makes the assertion (undocumented) that Swift "left Trinity without his higher degree, ostensibly because of his Uncle Godwin's decline in health and fortunes." The source for the innuendo that Swift uncandidly blamed his departure on his uncle seems to be Deanne Swift (Swift's nephew), a biographer whose assertions have been demonstrated to be frequently untrustworthy. But Swift himself, and Temple, his patron, and Ball, editor of his Correspondence, and Forster, one of his best biographers all refer his departure to this simple fact: that the Glorious Revolution produced in Catholic Ireland an upheaval which forced many Protestants, Swift among them, to flee the country. Not one of these authorities speaks of Swift blaming Uncle Godwin; not one, in this context, speaks of Godwin at all; but Dr. Greenacre, who lists all these authors in her bibliography, passes them by here as elsewhere to adopt a doubtful source.

Dr. Greenacre treats isolated or infrequent occurrences as though they were common or habitual. For example, on p. 40 she says that Swift "addressed Stella as 'Young Sir.'" (Undocumented.) The reader infers that this was Swift's usual, or at least common, mode of address -- the context deals with Swift's tendencies to neutralize the sex of women with whom he had some kind of intimacy. It comes as a shock, then, to discover that in his Journal to Stella, a correspondence containing 65 letters from Swift, he calls her "my dear" hundreds of times; that he uses most frequently a language of affectionate or bantering intimacy, and that "Young Sir," wherever it appears, is so rare as to demand careful qualification if it is to be

referred to. Again, on pp. 92 and 113 Dr. Greenacre says that Swift attributed his physical illness to the eating of "stone fruit." (Undocumented.) The implication is that Swift sensed the cause of his illness to relate to sex; but in his autobiography Swift simply speaks of "a surfeit of fruit," and in a letter of August, 1727, says, "I got my giddiness by eating a hundred golden pippins at a time."

The distortion of evidence takes other forms. At the beginning of Gulliver's Travels there are five references to Gulliver's master: "Mr. James Bates," "Mr. Bates," "my good master Bates," "Mr. Bates," and "my good master Bates dying." Dr. Greenacre wishes to establish the onanistic pun, which may, to be sure, have been intended, though for causes to be presented shortly it seems doubtful. In her summary of Voyage I she speaks of Bates thus: "Mr. James Bates," "His master, Bates," "Bates," "his good master, Bates," "master Bates." Dr. Greenacre does nothing with the pun at this point, pp. 62-63, but she plants the seed. On p. 99 she comes to reap and devotes a paragraph to proving that the pun is a pun and fits in with other indications of masturbatory fantasies. According to the New English Dictionary, however, "masturbation" first appears in English in 1766 (30 years after Gulliver was published), and the verb does not appear until 1857. Dr. Greenacre is aware of this fact but argues that since "masturbation appears in the title of a book by Hume in 1766," "we may surmise that it probably had fairly wide usage before this." Hume the historian and philosopher? Not at all. One A. Hume, a petty medical journalist whose work is merely a translation. The "masturbation" in his title does not even come from the English.

In her Introduction Dr. Greenacre wishes to establish Swift's similarity to Carroll: "Both were British islanders, and island bound." Later, however, she wishes to establish Swift's similarity to Gulliver: "Unlike Gulliver, Swift never travelled far . . . but he was a constant voyager between Ireland and England. (p. 63). Swift, in other words, travelled -- and did not travel -- as the argument would demand it. One notes, moreover, that Dr. Greenacre "proves" the second resemblance through language, not fact: Gulliver went on Voyages; Swift is a "voyager." (By the same technique, Stella's removal to Ireland becomes an "abduction" and is thus made to parallel Swift's own infantile experience, p. 106).

Occasionally the forcing of the evidence seems to be even more pronounced. On p. 114 Dr. Greenacre treats Gulliver's married life as "predominantly disgusting to him." Let anyone read the opening and closing pages of each of the four voyages and he will discover that Gulliver was happily married, and that his disgust appears only at the very end, after his life with the Houyhnhnms, and that, by that time, all mankind disgusted him. On p. 69 Dr. Greenacre says of Gulliver's second voyage: "Again the ship was diverted from its course by storms, and after a complete year of wandering (no account is given of the drain upon provisions), the entire crew landed on a new continent." The underlined portion is simply in error. The ship puts in at the Cape of Good Hope and stays there until the following March. Provisions are obtained, of course, from the land. On p. 84 appears the following: "From the age of one until his manhood [Swift] was not in contact with any member of his immediate family." Again, the statement is in error. Between the time of his return to Ireland as an infant until his mother's departure for England, Swift lived with his mother.

This last error -- a slip, to be sure, for Dr. Greenacre's earlier chapters show that she knows better -- points to the weakness underlying the method. By a free and easy manipulation of her sources, by treating the infrequent as frequent, by forcing the evidence to fit the pattern, by insisting on her argument through repetition, Dr. Greenacre attempts to dissipate doubts and wrap her readers in conviction. She is, in effect, creating what might be called the illusion of analysis. In the analysis of living persons, conducted over weeks and months in a series of sessions, the irrelevant drops away to reveal those nodes of psychic experience and suffering on the discovery of which therapy depends. In her study of Swift, Dr. Greenacre, by the methods noted, creates the illusion that these nodes are emerging. What seems possible in Chapter I is made to seem probable in Chapter II and certain, in Chapter IV. This is a way to persuasion; hardly to authentication.

The liabilities of Swift's infancy and youth "devoid of rich personal contact" were exactly reversed in Carroll's childhood. Why were they not assets to him? The answer is that he had to cope with a rapidly growing brood of siblings of which he was the oldest boy. In the ensuing struggle of rivalry and jealousy his aggressive and sexual strivings were all too successfully subdued. The general circumstances of Carroll's childhood would still have to be considered favorable if we were to judge them by general appearance and according to Carroll's own recollection. It is true that the large number of expressive tokens of this childhood which have come down to us suggest many tensions under all the pleasantness. So does, of course, the eccentric and self-limited conduct of Carroll's later life, and so does the content of his fantasy in his books, to which Dr. Greenacre has given a more satisfactory interpretation than to Swift's Gulliver. Still, it remains paradoxical that the exact positive to the alleged negative of Swift's childhood should have led to a similar disorder of character.

Dr. Greenacre surmises that the young Carroll, in addition to having to suppress rage and rivalry too quickly and completely, had to cope with the excitement that surrounded the frequent childbirths in his home. On the basis of the recurrent image of his fantasies, Dr. Greenacre constructs -- or one should perhaps say, postulates -- an incident of his being subjected to the sight of an exhibitionist gardener. In Carroll's experience sex had early been associated with aggression; the conduct of his later life aimed at denying and excluding both. Dr. Greenacre assumes that the decisive disturbance took place so early that it remained forever tied to images of eating and being eaten, accompanied by uncontrollable impulses, the mounting pressure of which threatened to burst destructively like an explosion. The consequence seems to have been a confusion of Carroll's sexual identity (for which he had to struggle anyway at the crucial age and amid a flock of sisters) and a distortion of his body image persistently reflected in his writing.

Both Swift and Carroll, according to Dr. Greenacre, show the character structure which underlies perversions such as fetishism and transvestitism. Nothing is known of any actual manifestation of such a disorder in either man, so that Dr. Greenacre speaks, rather unconvincingly, of the "negative" of perversion in them.

The question must be asked here: What is the purpose of such a study? Is it to demonstrate that artists have similar emotional reactions to similar emotional situations as other men, although

expressed in an uncommon manner -- and we choose authors because they write so much? Or should the psychoanalytic approach be used to trace the hidden veins of art-in-process -- and authors are chosen because their raw material is words? If the former case, the facts of an author's life and also his products will be used, regarding them as straws in a stream's current -- pointing toward the source. If the latter case, the same items will be collected and utilized as straws in the same current -- pointing, however, this time toward the mouth of the river and the origin of art.

In the sensitive reaction to unwittingly produced material, in recognition of the sideways-hidden, in comprehension of veiled allusions to events and attitudes unrecognized by the alluder, Dr. Greenacre is well qualified to study Lewis Carroll, the man. Is she as interested in Lewis Carroll, the creative artist? For example, Dr. Greenacre is fascinated by Sylvie and Bruno. That book is an extraordinary bundle of unequal content. She accepts this collection of words as precisely equal grist to her mill as his collected words in either of the Alices. To the literary critic, however, the fascination of Sylvie and Bruno is how it can be so poor whereas the Alices are so good. This difference in intrinsic quality cannot be due solely to its "lack of exquisiteness of truly economical expression" because many magnificent literary achievements have been accomplished by an author's ability to pile Pelion on Ossa. Nor can it be a failure solely because of the years of labored preparation. The much shorter Alices were polished for four years before publication. Furthermore, the spasmodic flow of high calibre nonsense was still being produced by Carroll in Sylvie and Bruno, witness the half dozen "I Thought I Saw" songs of The Gardener.

One very good reason for analyzing Carroll, in absentia of death, is that psychoanalysis might help show why the Alices are among the world's great literary achievements as pieces of a highly specialized art-form, while Sylvie probably could never have been published on its own merits, alone; why one of this man's polished dreams has been eagerly read by millions for almost a century, while another polished dream by the same man obviously belongs in the category of dreams you have to pay your analyst to listen to, for therapeutic purposes. The solution of this important question of the extraordinary difference in basic quality between one verbal symbolization of emotional reaction and another would, for the literary critic, be one important reason for undertaking what Dr. Greenacre has tried to do in this book. This aspect does not seem to interest her, particularly. But why should Carroll's ability to express his fantasies in such a way that they are of enduring attraction to others, not be a legitimate part of his personality? Why not, for that matter, of Swift's prose style?

Dr. Greenacre notes several somewhat obscure references to "jam" as contrasted to the syllable "jam" in Boojum. She states (p. 238) that "jam is the senseless subject talked about with fine distinctions as to degree of sensual enjoyment." Yet she makes no mention of that greatest sentence about jam in all literature which makes the pathetically lovable and fussily incompetent White Queen ring with such finality. Readers in many languages know "Jam yesterday and jam tomorrow but never jam today" because we all respond to that latent meaning and sense the tragic frustration of one who cannot experience real and present pleasure. But does not the quotation which Dr. Greenacre omitted change significantly the meaning of the subject?

Another example of two sets of lines by Carroll used by Dr. Greenacre as pieces of equal evidential value:

Say, Whence is the voice that, when anger is burning
 Bids the whirl of the tempest to cease?
 That stirs the vexed soul with an aching -- a yearning
 For the brotherly hand-grip of peace?
 Whence the music that fills all our being -- that shrills
 Around us, beneath, and above?
 I think it is Love
 For I feel it is Love
 For I'm sure it is nothing but Love!

 I weep for it reminds me so
 Of that old man I used to know --
 Whose look was mild, whose speech was slow
 Whose hair was whiter than the snow
 With eyes, like cinders, all aglow,
 Who seemed distracted with his woe,
 Who rocked his body to and fro
 And muttered mumblingly and low,
 As if his mouth were full of dough,
 Who snorted like a buffalo --
 That summer evening long ago
 A-sitting on a gate.

The reader need not be alerted to recognize that the second excerpt, nonsense or no, contains the real poetic frisson. It has qualities of a true threnody, and not solely because of the repeated O sound, powerful as that is. The first is only a clacking metronome with marshmallow whip poured over it. These two collections of words are not of equal evidential value, whether you are studying Carroll the man or Carroll the artist. For Carroll the neurotic man occasionally produced real art -- and that intermittently present factor is no small item, in both the man and his writing. Neither are two pieces of copper wire of the same length and weight identical, when electricity pours through one and not the other.

The recognition and evaluation and, if possible, some explanation for these irregular bursts of electric current through words (called creative literature in contrast to publication of yet another book) is the whole problem and function of literary criticism. That that hag-ridden Oxford don was occasionally able to function as a conductor and sometimes not, is the only reason that we and Dr. Greenacre ever heard of him. To discuss in the same vein art and non-art in the same man is from the point of literary criticism unacceptable. Nor can it in the end make for good psychology.

It might be best if a literary critic and an analyst would jointly undertake such an exploration. The analyst-explorer in terms of the earlier simile would turn upstream and the critic-explorer, down. Possibly, two records of exploration of the river might be recorded and then bound together. This leaves the individual reader where individuals invariably find themselves eventually: receiving reports on different aspects of the same matter and then reaching one's own conclusions about it-as-a-whole. But the analyst and the literary critic might also learn to accept each other's guidance whenever one or the other is not at home in the subject at hand, and emerge with an integration of the psychological and literary view which alone would do the task real justice.

Assessing the methodological premises of this book is made difficult by the fact that they are never made explicit. They are not argued but are taken for granted. Since it is not a question of classical psychoanalytic method, but of an incisive change of its conditions, a statement of method beyond the contentions which were quoted before is really needed. Nobody in the very extensive literature of psychoanalysis applied to historical personalities and circumstances appears yet to have made such a statement. It may be that this application of psychoanalysis has simply been viewed as an extension of the clinical method; but it is hard to see why the problems thus encountered have not led to a revision of this position.

The presentation of the book is not always clearly enough organized. The argument meanders between its several main points, shifting from one to another without notice, proposing here a conclusion without statement of premise, while repeating it there needlessly. Side-issues cause distraction and impede the argument so that some of the comments which are least important to the issue are also the most implausible ones: such as the attempted relating of the temple in Gulliver, Book I, to Sir William Temple, or that of Alice in Elfland (as the title read before Wonderland was chosen) to Elfinston, where some of Carroll's forebears lived. The argument also begins often with "it might seem possible," but finds itself soon, and without further substantiation, is raised to the level of "we are justified in concluding." The observation that a certain conjecture "is not out of harmony with the peculiar facts of Swift's life" does not yet allow for the conclusion that it is therefore so much in harmony with these facts that the conjecture is right and true. Facility in making quick trial-and-error conclusions is an important talent of the psychotherapist as well as of the creative scientist. In therapy these tentative guesses are part of the search for the most plausible configuration of what has so far been observed. The good therapist will, however, be as facile in discarding his hunches as he was in developing them.

The major pitfall in the transfer of the clinical method to a historical and literary subject lies in the tendency to retroactive argument. The constructions about Swift's childhood provide a good example. There are the compulsive traits in the adult Swift, his pre-occupation with cleanliness and filth, his revulsion toward the female body. Therefore, events must have happened (including the utterly contrived child which the nursemaid is supposed to have borne while Swift was with her) which will establish genetic continuity for later behavior. The problem lies in the degree to which the genetic sequences of psychoanalysis can be extended. We may well assume that they are sufficiently well established to be employed in exploratory hypotheses. If we find enough confirmation, these hypotheses become interpretations. Otherwise we must look for better hypotheses. If no further information is available, we may have to resign ourselves to a lacuna of uncertainty which will remain uncharted on our map. The alternative is to insist on hypothesis without confirmation, as Dr. Greenacre has done. This turns an inductive and empirical (though not fully conclusive) procedure into a deductive operation, a change in which insight may be the loser. A similar problem is involved in the logic of predicting that certain events in childhood will always lead to identical consequences. This is a perfectly good exploratory device. One cannot logically argue, however, as is so often done in such situations, "but look at the symptoms! What I postulate, must have happened in order to explain them." This might do if we dealt

with a closed system. Amidst the unending interaction of the individual with his environment we can entertain no such belief. Nor can we claim that genetic sequences are already specific enough to afford us detailed conclusions over the span of years and over the obscurity of circumstances of which the hero of our quest was but a small part.

One must ask in the end what this books has contributed to our psychological understanding of Swift and Carroll. In addition to having produced extraordinary works, both men were exceptional in their conduct: driven by secret urges, hemmed in by inhibitions and moved by strange idiosyncrasies, their life patterns differed markedly from those of other men. Obviously, each of them in his own fashion had to live with more than the usual weight of neurotic problems. Dr. Greenacre's study establishes a consistent pattern of motivation between the lives of these men and their writings.

As indicated before, this may be the major potential of psychoanalytic biography. Certainty is not the end of such an undertaking. There is in any case little certainty about the past, and the idea of evidence does not really apply to it. An interpretation of bygone events whether literary or historical, cannot be a search for the "truth:" it can only be an attempt to bring order into the confusion of reports, and to demonstrate that incoherent variety in the end follows a common principle. Interpretation cannot be true, but it can be parsimonious and consistent, and when it succeeds in relating past events to principles which we have found valid in present observation, it becomes plausible. The methodological problem of psychoanalytic biography is to make up for having to reason without the continuity of associative context, sharpened and focussed by the transference, from which interpretation in therapy derives. Instead, biographical interpretations may draw from a greater variety of materials and from more varied sources. The biographer knows, for instance, what an assortment of people have thought about his subject, which the therapist usually does not know about his patient; nor do many patients project their dreams into the artful context of literary creation. While the demands which these conditions impose upon the biographer have not been equally met in Dr. Greenacre's book, her interpretation of Swift and Carroll in its main dimensions contributes a degree of unity to their biographies which had not been achieved heretofore. They are more shrewdly observant than systematic, and sensitivity for the hidden implications of the life history is sometimes a little ahead of sensibleness.

Frederick Wyatt
Department of Psychology
Deborah Bacon
Arthur M. Eastman
Department of English
University of Michigan

BIBLIOGRAPHY (XXI)

A major contribution in psycho-literary criticism, previewed in Bibliography (XIX) (Vol. V, no. 2, May, 1955, p. 38), has appeared in Partisan Review:

Simon O. Lesser, "The image of the father," Vol. XXII, no. 3, Summer, 1955, pp. 372-390.

Another chapter from the author's monumental The Appeal of Fiction,* which once again points up our need for the publication of that work in full, the article deals with two American short stories, Hawthorne's "My Kinsman, Major Molineux" and Sherwood Anderson's "I Want to Know Why." The author sets off his psychoanalytic interpretation against previous attempts by Malcolm Cowley, Q. D. Leavis, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren to account for the tremendous impression which the two stories have made on many kinds of readers. Lesser concludes that this impression has its origin in unconscious perception on the part of the reader:

Although only the unconscious is likely to perceive it, in the last analysis both "My Kinsman, Major Molineux" and "I Want to Know Why" are stories of a boy's relationship with his father. Both describe more or less universal phases of the process of growing up, although, as in great fiction generally, the actual events are so altered that they may not be consciously recognizable, and so telescoped and heightened that they arouse profounder affects than the less dramatic and more gradual experiences they draw upon and evoke. (p. 390)

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The American Psychological Association has instituted a new publication, Contemporary Psychology, designed to carry book reviews and discussion of current works in various fields of psychology. In the first issue (Vol. 1, no. 1, January, 1956, p. 12) there appears

Harold G. McCurdy's review of W. David Sievers, Freud on Broadway: A History of Psychoanalysis and the American Drama (New York, Hermitage House, 1955).

Works in our field by the reviewer, who is on the faculty of the University of North Carolina, have been frequently noticed in our running bibliographies.² Professor McCurdy praises the industry and thoroughness which the work evidences, but he takes exception to "the author's wanton attribution of any and everything to that Great Man whom the title establishes so much more firmly on Broadway than the book does."

In what sense is a playwright Freudian, if he denies the influence? Can Seneca escape the label, or Euripides, just because his work was done ages ago? As far as Sievers is concerned the answer is simple: Anything is Freudian which either makes use of the Freudian lingo or presents human situations like those described by Freud. Now this is a very loose definition. (p. 12)

* See the correspondence in III, 3, p. 4; the leading articles in III, 4, pp. 2-5, and IV, 2, pp. 25-27; and bibliographical note in V, 3, p. 53.

² See, for example, V, 3, p. 52.

Professor David Bonnell Green calls our attention to the review of the Simenauer book on Rilke mentioned in Bibliography (XX), Vol. V, no. 4, p. 85, in

Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 14, 1955, p. 23.

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The Editors' sojourn in Switzerland has revealed the existence of an interesting series entitled

Collection Action et Pensée, published under the direction of Charles Baudouin and Jean Desplanque at Geneva, Switzerland, and Annemasse, France.

The series was designed to include works on psychology, general philosophy, and literary criticism. Among the works published was

A. Stocker, L'Amour Interdit: Trois Anges Sur la Route de Sodome (n. d.).

This study of homosexuality takes its point of departure from André Gide's Corydon and discusses various literary figures associated in one way or another with homosexuality, notably, of course, Oscar Wilde. The author is anti-Freudian, and his viewpoint seems to be that of an orthodox Roman Catholic. He has also published

De l'Ame chez les Poètes [Ovid, Huysmans, Ibsen], (Paris, Spes, 1940),

Berjamin Constant ou la Névrose Compensée (Genève, 1940),

Le Pain Dur de Paul Claudel. Psychologie de l'Homme Écartelé (Genève, 1941),

and

Des Hommes Qui Racontent leur Ame (St. Maurice, Suisse, Editions St. Augustin, 1943).

The work last named consists of three essays, one of which is entitled

"La Prière du Grand Will -- Étude psychologique de quelques sonnets de Shakespeare."

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One of the few journals published in French which is devoted, at least in part, to psycho-literary criticism, is

Psyché -- Revue Internationale des Sciences de l'Homme et de Psychanalyse (Founded in 1946 and published in Paris under the editorship of Mme. Maryse Choisy-Clouzet as the Bulletin de la Ligue d'Hygiène Mentale).

A search in Vol. 3 (1948) revealed the following:

In the January issue (no. 15):

Pierre Dufar, Celui dont on ne parle pas: EUGENE HUGO, sa vie, sa folie, ses oeuvres (Paris, Jean Fort, 1924). [This work, which deals with a brother of Victor Hugo, a psychotic who was at one time incarcerated at Charenton, is referred to in a footnote at p. 48.]

Emilio Servadio, "Note sur la Tête de Méduse," p. 73.

The article refers to castration symbolism and cites a note by

Freud, in Int. Zeitschrift für Psa. und Imago, 1940, pp. 105-106, and in Int. Journ. of Psa., 1941, pp. 69-70,

also

Sandor Ferenczi, "Über die Symbolik des Medusenkopfes,"
Int. Zeitschrift für Psa., 1923, p. 69,

and his own

"Die Angst vor dem Bösen Blick," Imago, 1936, pp. 396-409.

The issue also carries book and play reviews, among them

Henriette Brunot's on Robert Rochefort, Kafka ou l'ir-réductible espoir [a psycho-critical study], pp. 108-110,

and the same reviewer's account of the stage production of

Jean Anouilh, L'Invitation au Chateau, pp. 118-120.

in which she discusses the mechanism of the "double."

In the February issue (no. 16):

Juliette Boutonier, "Exploration de l'imaginaire," pp. 151-162,

François-Régis Bastide, "Don Juan; ou, la peur d'aimer," pp. 181-190,

and

Ania Teillard, "Anima-Animus," pp. 191-202. [A Jungian paper, referring to literary and artistic examples, including Hieronymus Bosch, Paul Claudel, La Divina Commedia, Le Diable au Corps, Lettres (sic) de la Portugaise, The Idiot, Gone with the Wind, Werther, and Wagner's Tristan.]

The March issue (no. 17) was devoted to pedagogy and pedapsychology and has only one item of tangential interest to us:

Clémence Ramnoux, "Expériences sur la transmission des légendes," pp. 310-323.

The combined April-May issue (no. 18-19) was devoted to a series of papers at a convention which centered around the theme "Culpabilité."

René Laforgue, "La Peste et la Vertu," pp. 406-420 [on Camus],

Robert Rochefort, "La Culpabilité chez Kafka," pp. 483-495,

O. Mannoni, "Vertu et Culpabilité," pp. 496-505 [Considers Byron and Lady Caroline Lamb as they are depicted in Cecil's biography of Melbourne],

J.-M. Conty, "Artistes, Économie et Culpabilité," pp. 506-513 [Baudelaire and Rimbaud],

and

C. G. Jung (trans. into French by Cohen-Salabelle), "Wotan," pp. 584-593, continued and completed in no. 21-22 (July-August) at pp. 777-782.

There is also a special article,

Claude Dominique, "La Culpabilité dans le cinéma américain," pp. 603-608 [Reviews The House of Dr. Edwards, Guilt (?), and M. Verdoux].

The June issue (no. 20) was devoted to original poetry and to literary criticism. It has

Maryse Choisy, "Littérature à propos du Culte Secret d'Edmond Jaloux," pp. 635-643 [M. Jaloux was a staunch

supporter of and contributor to this journal, although his contributions evidence little interest in psychodynamics per se.],

Charles Baudouin, "Sagesse de Don Quichotte," pp. 643-651,

René Laforge, "A propos de la pièce de J-P Sartre, Les Mains Sales," pp. 652-654,

Sigurd Naesgaard, "Le Complex de Sartre," [and also of Kierkegaard and Heidegger] pp. 655-664,

Aimé Patri, "A propos de Lautréamont et de la psychanalyse," pp. 665-673,

Stuart Gilbert (trans. into French by Mme. Choisy), "James Joyce," pp. 678-689,

Gaston Ferdière, "L'expérience vécue de Léonora Carrington," [author of En Bas] pp. 690-697.

The July-August issue (no. 21-22) was given over to a discussion of controversial questions, not literary for the most part, but note

Maryse Choisy, "L'Angoisse Cartésienne," pp. 738-751,

Robert Minder, "Mythes et Complexes Aggressifs dans l'Allemagne Moderne," pp. 783-794,

and

Claude Dominique's review of a Sacha Guitry film based on Le Diable Boiteux, pp. 967-968.

The September-October issue (no. 23-24) has

Clémence Ramnoux, "La fête du premier novembre," pp. 1020-1040 [Celtic folklore],

Juliette Boutonier's review of Mme. Choisy's L'Anneau de Polycrate, pp. 1167-1171,

Claude Dominique's review of the Olivier Hamlet film, pp. 1179-1182.

The November issue (no. 25) has

Louis-Jean Aulagne, "Sade; ou l'apologétique à l'envers," pp. 1245-1265,

André Michel's review of the Wagner Ring tetralogy, pp. 1305-1310.

The December issue (no. 26) appeared in February, 1949, and was devoted to the special topic Naissance:

Juliette Boutonier, "Naissance des héros," pp. 1335-1342,

Clémence Ramnoux, "Naissances divines et héroïques," pp. 1343-1353,

G. Balandrier, "Le poète et le magicien: deux attitudes de rupture," pp. 1366-1371 [mainly anthropological],

and

Henriette Brunot's review of Jean Anouilh, Ardèle ou la Marguerite, pp. 1410-1414.

[to be continued]

